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T
he  Treasury  proposes  to  invest 
$700  billion  in  mortgage-related 
securities to resolve the financial 
crisis,  using  market  mecha-
nisms  such  as  reverse  auctions 
to determine prices. A well-designed auction 
process  can  indeed  be  an  effective  tool  for 
acquiring  distressed  assets  at  minimum  cost 
to the taxpayer. However, a simplistic process 
could lead to higher cost and fewer securities 
purchased. It is critical for the auction process 
to be designed carefully.
The immediate crisis is one of illiquidity. 
Banks  hold  a  variety  of  mortgage-backed 
securities, some almost worthless while others 
retain considerable value. None can be sold, 
except  at  fire-sale  prices.  The  Treasury  pro-
poses to restore liquidity by stepping in and 
purchasing these securities. But at what price?
a simple approach leads to overpayment
A 
simple but naïve approach would be to 
invite the holders of all mortgage-related 
securities to bid in a single reverse auction. 
The Treasury sets an overall quantity of secu-
rities to be purchased. The auctioneer starts 
at a price of nearly 100 cents on the dollar. All 
holders of illiquid securities would presum-
ably be happy to sell at nearly face value, so 
there would be excess supply. The auctioneer 
then  progressively  lowers  the  price—90 
cents,  80  cents,  etc.—and  bidders  indicate 
the securities that they are willing to sell at 
each lower price. Eventually, a price, perhaps 
30 cents, is reached at which supply equals 
demand. The Treasury buys the securities of-
fered at the clearing pricing, paying 30 cents 
on the dollar.
This simplistic approach is fatally flawed. 
The Treasury pays 30 cents on the dollar, pur-
chasing all mortgage-related securities worth 
less than 30 cents on the dollar. Perhaps, on 
average, the purchased securities are worth 15 
cents on the dollar. The Treasury buys only the 
worst of the worst, intervening in a way that 
rewards the least deserving. And, as a result of 
overpaying drastically, the Treasury can mop 
up relatively few distressed securities with its 
limited budget. 
In  the  simplistic  approach,  competition 
among different securities overshadows com-
petition within securities and among bidders. 
The auction merely identifies which securities 
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are least valuable, rather than determining the 
securities’ value. An auction that determines a 
real price for a given security needs to require 
multiple  holders  of  the  security  to  compete 
with one another. This can be achieved if the 




hus, a better approach would be for the 
Treasury to instead conduct a separate auc-
tion for each security and limit itself to buying 
perhaps 50% of the aggregate face value. Again, 
the auction starts at a high price and works its 
way down. If the security clears at 30 cents on 
the dollar, this means that the holders value 
it at 30 cents on the dollar. (If the value were 
only 15 cents, then most holders would supply 
100% of their securities to be purchased at 30 
cents, and the price would be pushed lower.) 
The auction then works as intended. The price 
is reasonably close to value. The “winners” are 
the bidders who value the asset the least and 
value liquidity the most.
This auction has an important additional 
benefit. The “losers” are not left high and dry. 
By determining the market clearing price, the 
auction  increases  liquidity  for  the  remaining 
50% of face value, as well as for related securi-
ties. The auction has effectively aggregated mar-
ket information about the security’s value. This 
price  information  is  the  essential  ingredient 
needed  to  restore  the  secondary  market  for 
mortgage backed securities.
Handling  many  securities  is  a  straightfor-
ward extension. Different but related securities 
can be grouped together in the same auction and 
purchased simultaneously. Each security has its 
own price. The bidders indicate the quantity of 
each security they would like to sell at the speci-
fied prices. The price is reduced for any security 
with excess supply and the process repeats until 
a clearing price is found for each security.
Auctioning many related securities simul-
taneously gives the bidders some flexibility to 
adjust positions as the market gradually clears. 
This improves price formation and enables bid-
ders to better manage their liquidity needs. As 
a result, efficiency improves and taxpayer costs 
are further reduced.
For this auction design to work well, there 
needs to be sufficient competition. This should 
not be a problem for securities with diffuse own-
ership. For securities with more concentrated 
ownership,  various  approaches  are  possible. 
The Treasury could buy a smaller percentage of 
the face value. Alternatively, the Treasury could 
purchase the securities with the explicit under-
standing that the securities would be sold by 
auction some months or years in the future, 
after the liquidity crisis is over. To the extent 
that the securities are sold at a lower price, the 
holder would contractually owe the Treasury 
the difference, plus interest. 
One sensible approach for the sequencing 
of auctions is to start with the best of the worst; 
that is, begin the auctioning with a group of 
securities that are among the least toxic. These 
will  be  easier  for  bidders  to  assess,  and  the 
auction can proceed more quickly. Then, sub-
sequent auctions can move on to the increas-
ingly problematic securities. In this way, the 
information  revealed  in  the  earlier  auctions 
will facilitate the later auctions.
The basic auction approach suggested here 
is neither new nor untested. It was introduced 
over the last ten years and has been used suc-
cessfully in many countries to auction tens of 
billions of dollars in electricity and gas con-
tracts. It is quite similar to the approach that 
has  been  used  to  auction  more  than  $100 --
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billion in mobile telephone spectrum world-
wide. It is a dynamic version of the approach 
that financial markets use for share repurchases. 
If implemented correctly, each auction can be 
completed in less than one day.
Thus,  the  auction  approach  meets  the 
three  main  requirements  of  the  rescue  plan: 
1) provide a quick and effective means for the 
Treasury  to  purchase  mortgage-related  assets 
and increase liquidity; 2) yield prices that are 
closely related to value; and 3) provide a trans-
parent rules-based mechanism that treats dif-
ferent security holders consistently and leaves 
minimal scope for discretion or favoritism.
Indeed, the second and third requirements 
may  be  decisive  for  obtaining  broad  politi-
cal support. The main alternative to auctions 
put forward by the Treasury is to employ pro-
fessional  asset  managers.  To  the  extent  that 
negotiations  or  other  individualized  trading 
arrangements are used, the public will be right-
fully wary that favoritism may be exerted and 
that some security holders will be offered sweet-
heart deals. By contrast, a transparent auction 
process is readily subjected to oversight.
The Treasury appears to be embarking on 
the greatest public intervention into financial 
markets  since  the  Great  Depression.  The 
ultimate success or failure of the intervention 
may depend on the fine details of the auction 
design. Let’s get it right.
Letters commenting on this piece or others may 
be  submitted  at  http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
submit.cgi?context=ev.